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1. Introduction
This paper is about the meaning of the progressive aspect, which has been notoriously
difficult to give a satisfying account of.1 A number of intriguing properties of its meaning
were first brought out in formal semantic treatments. An event semantics approach to the
progressive which integrates concepts of normality and perspective as well as adequate
lexical representations seems to be particularly promising. In section 2 I will present
several problems connected with the semantics of the progressive that are crucial for
shaping its truth conditions. Several solutions to these problems that have been suggested
in the literature will be discussed.2 In section 3 I will sketch a preliminary account of the
meaning of the progressive aspect. In section 3.1 the basic components that underlie the
truth conditions of the progressive will be described. In section 3.2 I will present
underlying lexical assumptions and the truth conditions for the progressive. Finally, in
section 4, I will evaluate the proposal by revisiting the problems discussed.
2. Seven problems out of many
The imperfective paradox: One of the widespread traditional ideas about the meaning of
the progressive conveys that sentences in the progressive aspect refer to events in progress,
i.e., events that are not yet completed. This can be illustrated by a very simple scenario:
Scenario A: Rebecca stepped onto the street, walked towards the other side (tR), and
reached the sidewalk.
While this scenario can be described by a sentence in the simple past (1a), the event in
progress at reference time tR can be referred to by a sentence in the progressive, as in (1b).
(1) a. Rebecca crossed the street.
b. Rebecca was crossing the street.
This leads to a very straightforward idea that has been formulated in terms of interval
semantics by Bennett and Partee (1972) and that can be rendered in event semantics as in
P1:
(P1)    The Extensional Approach   
PROG(p) is true iff the event  described by PROG(p) is part of an event ’
described by p.
P1 requires that the sentence in the simple form p be true in order for the progressive
sentence PROG(p) to be true. But this is wrong. Another simple scenario shows that this
condition does not in fact hold:
                                                  
1 This research has been carried out as part of the project “Theory of the Lexicon” (SFB 282), supported by
the German Science Foundation (DFG). I am grateful to Jennifer Ruth Austin, Manfred Krifka and two
anonymous referees for comments.
2 To make these different approaches comparable I will rephrase them in terms of event semantics. Since
these reformulations are of course not straightforward translations of the original proposals, the criticisms
may not always carry over to the original approaches.
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Scenario B: Rebecca stepped onto the street, walked towards the other side (tR) when
she stumbled over a pothole and hurt her leg so badly that she didn’t reach the
sidewalk on the other side.
We can still use (1b) to refer to this situation which shows that the event does not have to
culminate to make the progressive sentence true. This observation involves the well-known
imperfective paradox (cf. Dowty 1979: 146): with non-resultative verbs the progressive
sentence entails the sentence in the simple form (2a), while this is not the case for
resultative verbs (2b), i.e., verbs that are lexically marked for a specific result state.
(2) a. [Rebecca was pushing the cart fi Rebecca pushed the cart]
b. Ø [Rebecca was crossing the street fi  Rebecca crossed the street]
This has led most aspectologists to assume that some kind of intensionality is involved in
the meaning of the progressive. Thus, Dowty (1979) provides us with an intensional
version of P1 making use of the notion of “inertia worlds” which can “be thought of as
worlds which are exactly like the given world up to the time in question and in which the
future course of events after this time develops in ways most compatible with the past
course of events.” (Dowty 1979: 148). In event semantics his approach aproximately
amounts to the following:
(P2)    The Normality Approach   
PROG(p) is true, iff in all inertia worlds the event  described by PROG(p) is part of
an event e’ described by p.
Thus, according to P2 to evaluate the truth of a sentence in the progressive we just have to
look at those worlds where everything proceeds normally.
The interruption problem: Still, P2 cannot deal with numerous cases. To show this, we
have to bring Rebecca into another unpleasant situation (cf. Vlach 1981: 285f):
Scenario C: Rebecca stepped onto the street, walked towards the other side very
inattentively (tR) while nearby a bus was approaching her driven by a very inattentive
driver.
If everything proceeds as can be expected from this course of events, the bus will hit
Rebecca so that she won’t reach the other side. Thus, P2 predicts that (1b) is false under
this scenario, but it is not. An interruption coming from outside the event we are referring
to, no matter if it could be expected or not, does not affect the truth of the progressive
sentence. This leads Vlach (1981: 288) to base the truth conditions for the progressive on
the possible continuation of the event referred to:
(P3)    The Continuity Approach   
PROG(p) is true iff in those worlds where the event described by PROG(p)
continues after the reference time of PROG(p) e will be a part of an event e’
described by p.
The restriction in P3 allows us to do away with the bus in Scenario C and just look at those
worlds where the walking event continues beyond the point where it got interrupted in the
actual world. But Landman (1992: 12) observed that the event might have continued
beyond this point but then got interrupted a couple of seconds later because there was a
second bus coming down the street. According to P3, the progressive sentence should now
be false, but it is not. Thus, Landman (1992: 12) suggested that to improve P3, the
condition should include that e continues beyond any possible interruption.
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The impossibility problem: The truth conditions in P3, even in their improved version,
still cannot cope with another problem, as Landman (1992) observed.
Scenario D: Rebecca was on the beach near Brisbane. She went swimming and, at tR,
had already swum a couple hundred yards towards the east.
We can assume that if Rebecca continues what she is doing at tR bey nd that time and the
sharks don’t get her she will end up in Chile eventually. According to P3 the sentence
Rebecca was crossing the Pacific should be true under this scenario, but it obviously is not.
It seems that if there is hardly any chance that the event culminates, the idea of its
uninterrupted continuation does not license the progressive. Therefore, Landman (1992:
25) tries to make the concept of “a reasonable chance on the basis of what is internal to e in
w” part of the truth conditions of the progressive. A greatly simplified version of this is
given in P4:
(P4)    The reasonable-chance approach   
PROG(p) is true iff in those worlds where there are no event-external interruptions
the event e described by PROG(p) has a reasonable chance to be part of an event e’
described by p.
The intention problem: P4 still does not say what distinguishes ‘event-external’ from
‘event-internal’ and what counts as a reasonable chance (cf. Glasbey 1996: 334). Consider
the following situation:
Scenario E (adapted from Asher 1992: 477): Rebecca, who was very depressed at
the time, wanted to commit suicide and therefore stepped onto the street and walked
towards the other side (tR) in order to get hit by a bus in the middle of the street.
Under this scenario (1b) is inappropriate. To make an agentive progressive sentence true,
the agent should not intend that the event does not culminate. Landman (1992) probably
would say that if Rebecca does not even intend to cross the street the event is not very
likely to culminate. In this case, (1b) would correctly be predicted as false. But Landman
does not discuss this problem.
Naumann and Piñón (1997) try to account for the intention problem more directly and
assume that for a sentence in the progressive to be true, the possible agent of the event
referred to must – at reference time – be able to bring the event to its culmination and must
not intend to not carry out the whole event. Somewhat simplified their approach looks like
this:
(P5)    The intention-and-ability approach   
PROG(p) is true, iff there is a world w where the event  described by PROG(p) is
part of an event ’ described by p, and iff the agent (if there is one) is able to bring 
to a culmination, and does not intend the non-culmination of e.
But this seems to be too strict. According to P5 the sentences in (3) should be impossible
since it is explicitly expressed that the agent intends the non-culmination of the event, but
they are not.3 Intention seems to be an important parameter in the truth conditions of the
progressive, but it is not a necessary condition for agentive progressive sentences.
(3) a. John intended not to kill Rebecca, but, nutritionally ignorant, he was killing her
by feeding her too much tasty but greasy food.
b. although she really intended not to do it she was making him a millionaire by
placing all his money on the skinniest nag at the races.
                                                  
3 More precisely, the truth conditions Naumann and Piñón (1997) give require that the speaker believes at
the agent does not intend the non-culmination of the event, but even for this version the sentences in (3) are
counterexamples.
Proceedings of the 2001 Conference of the Australian Linguistic Society 4
The perspective problem: Another problem is brought up by Landman (1992: 30f) in the
appendix of his paper. It is illustrated by the following scenario:4
Scenario F: Rebecca was on a plane to Canberra, which had started at nine o’clock;
at ten o’clock (tR) hijackers forced the captain to fly to Mount Isa, where the plane
landed at eleven o’clock.
Under this scenario we can truthfully utter not only (4a) but also (4b). This is surprising,
since according to the semantics of negation either p or Ø p should be true, but not both.
This cannot be explained by any of the approaches discussed.
(4) a. Rebecca was flying to Canberra when the plane was hijacked.
b. Rebecca was flying to Canberra; well, in fact, she wasn’t, she was flying to
Mount Isa, but she didn’t know that at the time.
It seems that in (4a) we adopt a perspective that is different from the one we choose in
(4b). In (4a) the actual outcome of the event does not play a role; I will call this the
‘intensional perspective’. (4b), in contrast, is viewed as if from a later point of view. It
takes the outcome of the event in the actual world into consideration; I will call this the
‘extensional perspective’.5
The ‘imperfective-paradox’ paradox: Among the problems that one comes across when
thinking about the progressive is a problem which is of a more lexical nature:
Scenario G: In court, the judge examines a witness; it is known that the witness
observed all the incidents relevant to the case in question (from at least five o’clock
to five fifteen) ...
Ignorant judge: “What was happening at five o’clock?”
Omniscient witness:“I was standing at the window at five and I saw that Rebecca
was killing Jamaal while Linda was drying her hair.”
... (Scenario G1) At five fifteen Jamaal was dead and meanwhile (because her
hairdryer had broken or she had just decided to do so) Linda had stopped drying her
hair, which was still pretty wet.
... (Scenario G2) At five fifteen Linda’s hair was dry and Jamaal wasn’t dead, since
Rebecca had stopped strangling him (because the rope had broken or she had
changed her mind).
Under scenario G1, the witness told the truth; he didn’t commit himself to the claim that
Linda dried her hair completely. But under scenario G2 we cannot accept his testimony
that Rebecca was killing Jamaal, since he knew that Jamaal survived.6 The exp cted
imperfective paradox doesn’t show up, since we tend to conclude that Jamaal was dead
afterwards. This is what I want to call the ‘imperfective-paradox’ paradox. The following
examples show that the denial of the event’s culmination is nearly impossible for the
progressive of some verbs:
(5) a. At five, Linda was drying her hair but in the end, it wasn’t completely dry.
b. ??at five, Rebecca was killing Jamaal but in the end, he wasn’t dead.
                                                  
4 Cf. also Bonomi (1997) for more refined examples of the perspective problem.
5 Asher (1992) and Glasbey (1996) employ different concepts of ‘perspective’ that I don’t have space to
discuss here.
6 There is an emphatic reading in which it is understood that the killing is not completed (I had to interfere; I
mean, she was killing him!) which we also get for sentences in the simple future (She will kill him, I have to
interfere!). Both have to be interpreted counterfactually.
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c. at five, she was crossing the Red Square, but in the end she hadn’t completely
crossed it.
d. ??at five, she was burning down the house, but in the end she hadn’t burnt it
down.
The ‘complex-event’ problem: The last problem I want to discuss briefly shows up with
verbs denoting causative events.
Scenario H: Jamaal was attacking Rebecca with a knife and stabbed her a couple of
times (tR1) whereupon Rebecca collapsed; lying on the floor (R2), she died in a few
minutes.
Referring to the reference time tR1 sentence (6a) is perfect while the same sentence uttered
with respect to tR2 is false. According to the approaches discussed so far this is unexpected.
If we assume that to kill means something like ‘cause to die’, what is happening at tR2 is
part of the event described in (6b). For causative verbs whose causing subevent precedes
the caused subevent the progressive has to be related to the first, causing subevent.
(6) a. Jamaal was killing Rebecca.
b. Jamaal killed Rebecca.
3. The meaning of the progressive aspect
3.1. The ingredients
Mereological relations: The truth conditions should express that the event e d scribed by
PROG(p) is a part of an event e’ described by p, where ’ can occur in a non-actual world.
A part should be understood as a ‘natural part’, which is not a mere temporal stage but
something whose particular properties allow it to be delineated from other units. For
example, a particular baseball game has as its parts a particular homerun, a particular catch
or a particular fast ball. Any natural part of an event is a subevent, i.e., an event itself
which is temporally related to all other subevents. With respect to events referred to by
causative verbs like to dry, a causing event (i.e., the action performed by the agent on the
theme entity) and a caused event (i.e., the theme entity becoming dry) can be distinguished
as immediate subevents (see section 2.2).
The interruption condition: I  section 2 it was shown that certain kinds of external
interruptions must be abstracted away from when judging the truth of a progressive
sentence. The following scenario (adapted from Asher 1992) will show that Landman’s
(1992) vague idea of what is internal to the event is too generous.
Scenario I: Rebecca stood in front of a huge minefield, started walking and walked
about 50 yards into the minefield (tR).
Under this scenario the sentence Rebecca is crossing the minefield should be odd, since (i)
it is almost impossible that Rebecca completes her crossing and (ii) what is happening with
the minefield (e.g. exploding mines) can be considered event-internal because he
minefield occupies an event-related argument position. But most speakers find the sentence
acceptable. Thus, a more restricted notion of what is internal to the event seems to be in
order. I will assume that only so-called ‘agent-internal interruptions’ affect the truth of the
progressive. These agent-internal interruptions have their origin in the immediate domain
of the proto-agent;7 they include wrong or missing intentions and abilities or sudden
                                                  
7 I use the term ‘proto-agent’ in the sense of Dowty (1991). It refers to the event-participant that has the most
agentive properties. A proto-agent is not necessarily an animated being.
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changes in intention, ability, or physical structure of the agent.8 All other interruptions are
considered external, e.g., the bus in scenario C and the exploding mines in scenario I.
The normality condition: Having abstracted away from external interruptions, the
culmination of the event has to be modally restricted in a certain way to make the
progressive sentence true. Some have suggested that the culmination has to be possible
(Glasbey 1996, Naumann and Piñón 1997), some have assumed that there has to be a
reasonable chance of culmination (Landman 1992), and other approaches might even
imply that the culmination has to be probable to make the progressive true.9 I’m not quite
sure if a mere possibility condition might be too weak, but a probability condition is
definitely too strong:10
Scenario J: Jamaal was participating in an amateur tightrope walking contest. He
usually falls off the rope three out of four times. He started walking on the rope
which was tightened across the arena and took a couple of steps (tR).
This scenario can be easily referred to with Jamaal was crossing the arena, showing that
even if it is only remotely possible that the crossing is completed, the progressive can be
used. For the time being, I will assume that the modal part just says that, external
interruptions aside, the completion of the event must be possible.11
Perspective: The truth of a sentence in the progressive has to be evaluated with respect to
a perspective. To keep things as simple as possible I will assume that there are just two
perspectives, an extensional one and an intensional one, where the choice of a perspective
is determined by semantic and pragmatic factors. We can conceive of perspectives as
functions from events to sets of worlds. The extensional perspective (i) assigns the actual
world to the event, the intensional perspective (ii) assigns to the event all worlds in which
the event is not externally interrupted:12
(7) a. PerspEXT(e) = {w0}
b. PerspINT(e) = {w | e is not stopped in w by agent-external interruptions}
3.2. The recipe
Lexical entries: As section 2 has shown, the lexical influence on the interpretation of
sentences in the progressive has to be taken into consideration. With some verbs (to kill, to
burn down) the result state is somehow prominent. These verbs evoke the ‘imperfective-
paradox’ paradox. Furthermore, with verbs like to ki l which involve more than one
subevent, the progressive is related to the first subevent. I will therefore assume that the
meaning of verbs is expressed by lexical event structures which capture these differences.
                                                  
8 An anonymous referee confronted this idea with the example R becca was crossing the road when she
suddenly remembered she'd left the kettle on gas and had to turn back. This s ggests that my idea about what
counts as an event-internal interruption is still too generous. It might be necessary to restrict the class of
event-internal interruptions to interruptions which are due to those wrong or missing intentions and abilities
and insufficiencies of the physical structure of the agent which were already given at he beginning of the
event.
9 Asher (1992) assumes a default implication relation between the simple and the progressive sentence,
which in some cases amounts to a probability condition (cf. Glasbey 1996).
10 Cf. also the examples in Bonomi (1997: 187).
11 I am aware that this is too simple. In particular, the problem of incompatible result states has to be taken
into consideration (cf., e.g., Dowty 1979, Naumann and Piñón 1997): Referring to a falling coin, both
sentences the coin is coming up heads an  the coin is coming up tails are odd. The progressive does not seem
to be possible if it refers to an event that is part of several equally probable culminations of events.
12 The term ‘actual world’ shouldn't be taken to literally if we want to deal with examples like I dr amed
Rebecca was crossing the street. The external perspective picks the world w0 as the world in which the
process part of the event takes place, i.e. the world which counts as actual in the particular setting, while the
internal perspective also yields worlds different from w0.
Proceedings of the 2001 Conference of the Australian Linguistic Society 7
Lexical event structures contain variables for e1 and e2 as subevents, s as a result state, ‘*’
as an indicator of a prominent result state, ‘<’ as a temporal precedence relation, and ‘<>’
as a relation of temporal overlap.13
(8) a. to kill: e1 </<>CAUSE e2 < s*
b. to cross: e1 < s
(8a) for example expresses that a killing involves a first causing subevent (the agent acting
upon the theme), a second temporally overlapping or following caused subevent (the theme
referent dying) and a result state (the being dead of the theme referent). This result state is
marked as prominent.14 The meaning of this notion is admittedly vague. I suspect that
either causative verbs that are rather unspecific with respect to the activities in the first
subevent or verbs with resultative particles involve prominent result states. Thus, the
prominence marker might turn out to be derivable from other lexical information.
Truth conditions: As a starting point for a more refined theory of the progressive I will
assume that the progressive is a three place relation PROG(e,E,Persp) with the following
truth conditions:15
(P6)    The perspective approach   
PROG(e,E,Persp) is true iff
(i) there is an event ’ and a world w Î  Persp(e) such that e’ occurs in w and e is a
part of e’,
(ii) e is of event type E where E is the VP translation and is associated with its
lexically projected event structure LESE,
(iii) e occurs in the actual world w0 at reference time tR and has all of the properties
that are specified in LESE for the first subevent of e’.
Choice of perspective: Finally, I will give a list of the semantic and pragmatic factors that
determine the choice of a perspective. In some cases one perspective is forced, in other
cases both are equally available. The following list is not meant to be complete: We tend to
choose PerspEXT (i) if the outcome of the event is conversationally relevant, (ii) if
adverbials like in fact or actually occur,16 (iii) if the lexically specified result state is
prominent, and iv) if it is known that the event culminates. We tend to choose P rspINT (i)
if the outcome of the event is not relevant, (ii) if there is no information about the further
course of the event available, and (iii) probably by default.
                                                  
13 These are only partial event structures. Information about semantic relations, temporal and other
properties of subevents is left out here. For an overview of this lexical event structure theory cf. Engelberg
(1999) and for a more thorough presentation of the theory Engelberg (2000).
14 For different purposes Pustejovsky (1995: 72) employs a similar concept ‘head of an event’, which he
relates to the notion of ‘foregrounding’.
15 It should be noted that the truth conditions and scenarios in this paper presuppose that the progressive is
used in combination with simple tenses (simple past, simple present, simple future), i.e. those tenses in which
the time of reference and the time of event overlap in a Reichenbachian tense theory. If we want to extend
this theory to uses of the progressive in the perfect tenses by adapting the truth conditions in P6 o
Reichenbach's framework, we would have to relate the occurrence of the event (in condition iii of P6) to the
time of event and not to the time of reference. In the past perfect, for which Reichenbach (1966) assumes the
relation ‘time of event < time of reference < time of speech’, the occurrence of the event in the progressive
has to be located before the time of reference which is marked by the cosmic intervention in she had b en
jogging for a while when the comet hit her. The embedding of the proposal in a Reichenbachian theory of
tense seems straightforward.
16 Under scenario C these adverbials even allow one to refer to a miraculous completion of the event; cf. the
following example sentence from Landman (1992: 30): I would never have believed it at the time, but she
was actually crossing the Atlantic.
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4. Conclusion - the problems revisited
The preceding ideas are not meant to be a theory of the progressive. They rather serve to
identify the components that have to go into the semantics of the progressive. A strict
formalization of this idea is still another matter.17 Nevertheless, something like P6 s ems
to be on the right track to solve the problems discussed in section 1: The imperfective
paradox does not occur because of PerspINT. The interruption problem is solved by
integrating interruption in the perspective functions and by sharpening the border between
internal and external interruptions. The impossibility problem is done away with by having
introduced a possibility condition into the truth conditions. The intention problem does not
occur because on the one hand, wrong or changed intentions are considered internal
interruptions, and on the other hand, if there is a denial of the intention to bring the event
to a culmination, the extensional perspective is chosen. The perspective problem is solved
by evaluating the truth of progressive sentences relative to a perspective. And finally,
appropriate lexical representations help to solve the ‘imperfective-paradox’ paradox and
the complex-event problem, the former because prominent result states trigger Per pEXT,
the latter because of the introduction of condition (ii) in the truth conditions.
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